“There was a want of vigilance”: Intelligence in the Bristoe Station Campaign

The Mosby Heritage Area is a wide landscape of historic rivers and turnpikes crisscrossed by rail lines. Our location in between the Potomac River and Richmond was crucial to United States and Confederate forces during the Civil War, even though relatively few large-scale battles were fought here. The Heritage Area did see a number of fast-moving campaigns as armies attempted to out-flank, out-smart, and out-maneuver each other along essential travel and supply lines. The Bristoe Campaign in October 1863 falls under this category. Much of this campaign was colored by scant information, leading to close shaves on both sides before A.P. Hill’s decisive action on October 14th.

Fall 1863 found Generals Meade and Lee apparently deadlocked in central Virginia on opposite sides of the Rapidan River between Orange Courthouse and Culpeper Courthouse. Both Union and Confederate commanders learned hard lessons on the road from Gettysburg, and both recently sent supporting corps to the western theater. By October, Meade and the Federal Army seemed prepared to make winter quarters. The United States position at the fork of the Rapidan and Rappahannock controlled not only the Rappahannock crossing, but also the crucial supply line of the Alexandria & Orange railroad.

Plans for a peaceful fall were thwarted when the Federal signalmen on Pony Mountain intercepted a message on October 7. Lee was on the move. Not knowing the Confederate codes had been broken, Lee urged his commanders to be careful and quiet as they skirted the Federal line, attempting to cut off Meade’s rear route along the A&O. But since receiving the decoded message, Federal scouts were primed to notice graycoats moving on the right flank, and campfires missing from the Confederate main body by night. With the signal towers going silent as armies began to move, they would have to rely on traditional intelligence- namely their cavalry- for information during the rest of the campaign.

Meade’s first requirement was to find out where exactly the Confederates were headed. He sent John Buford’s cavalry division to scout the Federal right flank for more signs of Lee, but recalled him after not hearing for two days. Meanwhile, Stuart’s Confederate cavalry harassed Gregg’s and Kilpatrick’s Federal cavalrymen in the vicinity of Brandy Station, resulting in erroneous reports that the Confederate forces were concentrating in Culpeper. By the time the Federal forces caught wise, Ewell’s and Hill’s divisions were closing on Warrenton, having swung wide to catch Meade’s rear on the A&O. Meade acts swiftly to outmaneuver the rebels, benefiting from a direct route up the A&O towards the fortifications at Centreville. The race was on.

With both armies moving quickly, reconnaissance was done on the fly, leading to fighting at Auburn on October 13th when Stuart tried poking around the Union supply train and found himself surrounded by the Federal Second and Third Corps. He his own men, supplies, and artillery in a ravine during the night, a mere 300 yards from his foes. The following morning Stuart surprised a regiment of breakfasting Yankees with a volley from his artillery. His bluff succeeded in unseating Gouvenor Warren’s Second Corps, which marched quickly along the A&O and by early afternoon had reached Bristoe Station.

The afternoon of October 14th found A.P. Hill scouting for an attack. From his position the Confederate Second Corps could just make out the Federal Third and Fifth Corps moving from eastward over Broad Run. If the rebels moved quickly (without reconnaissance), they just might catch them. Instead Hill’s North Carolinians under Cooke and Kirkland were caught by Warren’s Second Corps, which had been recuperating from the morning fighting at Auburn, taking shelter on the southern side of the high railroad embankment. Unseen until the last moment, Federals sprang up and fired, cutting down waves of gray-clad rebels. Over the next couple of hours about 2,000 men fell, effectively putting an end to Lee’s devices on Meade’s supply route.

While Gouvenor Warren earned some praise for his action at Bristoe Station, the United States press was reluctant to call the battle a Union victory. There was even talk of Meade’s replacement. In the Confederacy, there was little doubt that Bristoe was a blunder and a loss. Hill was lambasted as a fool for making an attack with so little information. Confederate President Jefferson Davis critically pointed out, “There was a want of vigilance”.

Though much of the area surrounding Bristoe Station has been developed, preservation efforts have ensured that large sections of the battlefield are open to learn and explore. For more information about the battle and ongoing preservation, visit our friends at the Bristoe Station Battlefield Park!

Class Activity: In your own words, answer the following questions

1. What are different ways Civil War officers gained intelligence or communicated with each other? Describe at least two.
2. Examine the image above, “The Union second corps position.” United States troops sheltered behind this railroad embankment during the battle. What made it such a good position?
3. Why do you think we should preserve historic landscapes like the battlefield near Bristoe Station?