“With the prisoners at the top of the mountain at Ashby’s Gap”

On the morning of October 17, 1781 the unthinkable happened. A drummer appeared on the British entrenchments at Yorktown, followed closely by an officer carrying a white handkerchief. Their appearance marked the end of the Siege of Yorktown, and in many ways, the end of the War for Independence. Although sporadic fighting would continue until the Treaty of Paris was adopted two years later, the Franco-American victory at Yorktown marked the end of major campaigning in North America and the de facto recognition of American independence. It also marked the beginning of a major problem for George Washington – what to do with thousands of prisoners?

The Surrender at Yorktown by Louis-Nicolas van Blarenberghe

In the aftermath of Yorktown, over 7,000 British, German, and American Loyalists were now prisoners of the Continental Army. This number was roughly equal to the number of men under Washington’s command, and it was essential to move them away from the coast and any potential British rescue. It was also necessary to move them to the interior of the continent in order to find a place untouched by the war, where food and shelter could be obtained. Throughout the war towns like York, Pennsylvania; Frederick, Maryland; and Winchester and Charlottesville, Virginia were used to house increasing numbers of prisoners. Even smaller inland towns, such as Leesburg, had seen groups of British and German soldiers from time to time.

Camp Security, outside of Charlottesville, was typical of a POW camp in the American backcountry.

Now, faced with a massive number of captured men and officers to house, Washington chose to split the prisoners into two groups. The first was bound for Winchester, the second for Fort Frederick, a disused French and Indian War-era fort near Hancock, Maryland. On October 25th he wrote his Commissary for Prisoners Abraham Skinner the following letter outlining the numbers of prisoners, their regiments, and their destinations:

To the Commissary General of Prisoners
Camp near York 25th Octr 1781

Winchester
Artillery 193
Guards 467
23d Regiment 205
43d Do 307
76 Do 625
2 Battalions of Anspach 948
Queens Rangers 248
Pioneers 33
3029

Fort Frederick
Light Infantry 594
17th Regiment 205
33d Do 225
71st Do 242
80th Do 588
Prince Hereditory 425
Regt De Bosc 271
Yagers 68
British Legion 192
North Carolina Volunteers 114
2924

You are to dispose of the Prisoners as above.
G. Washington

Now that the arrangements were made, the question became how to get the prisoners to their destinations. Rations and other supplies needed to be collected and a route of march needed to be planned out. For security, Washington called upon a number of Virginia militia companies to act as guards, including several from the Heritage Area. Until 1781, the Revolutionary War was fought largely outside of Virginia, and as a result the militia of the northern Piedmont had seen relatively little combat. Local companies called out to assist the army at Yorktown, especially those of Fauquier County, were chosen to escort the prisoners northward.

The long march began on October 21st. The column stretched out for miles along the road from Yorktown, as soldiers, officers, livestock, wagons, and women and children clogged the route. The militia division marched at the head, with guards scattered about the length. It would take the slow moving mass over a week to reach the Rappahannock River at Falmouth. Near constant rain and dropping temperatures slowed progress further. One British officer noted with some humor that the Piedmont men guarding the column seemed to have little love for their tidewater countrymen:

our guards were all from the upper parts of the state, called backwoodsmen, between whom and the inhabitants of the lower parts there existed no cordiality; and at night when we halted, they not only allowed but even encouraged our men to pull down and make fires of the fence-rails…when the proprietor complained, they only laughed at him

Samuel Graham, 76th Highland Regiment

The prisoners continued northward on the road and into Prince William County, resting briefly near Dumfries. On November 2nd they reached Fairfax Courthouse. Here the prisoners were split into two groups, as outlined by Washington’s instructions. The Maryland-bound prisoners moved northwest into Loudoun County. Marching through Leesburg and turning up the Carolina Road, they crossed the Potomac at Noland’s Ferry, where they were handed over to Maryland militia to continue their journey to Fort Frederick.

Nolands Ferry, where the north-bound prisoners crossed the Potomac into Maryland.

The remaining prisoners, numbering around 3,000, turned westward along the old colonial road to Ashby’s Gap. Decades later the road would become known as the Ashby’s Gap Turnpike, and it is now traced by US Route 50, but in the 1780s it was a muddy wagon road that followed an ancient Native American path. The prisoners trudged on through the increasingly cold weather. They forded Goose Creek just downstream from the current location of the Goose Creek Bridge, and the Blue Ridge Mountains loomed closer and closer each day.

Looking east into Fauquier County from Ashby’s Gap. The view is remarkably similar today to what the marchers would have seen as they took one last look back before crossing the mountain.

The footsore and bedraggled column reached the foot of Ashby’s Gap on the morning of Sunday, November 4th. While the men began the steep ascent up the mountain pass, several officers gathered for a meal at Ashby’s Tavern in the village of Paris. Samuel Graham, a Scottish officer in the 76th Highlanders, recounted his encounter with the landlady many years later:

I asked Mrs. Ashley [Ashby] if she could give two or three of us anything to eat. She stared at my uniform, saying — ” A militiaman, I guess.” ” No,” was my reply. ” Continental, mayhap” to which I also replied in the negative. “Ho!” said she, ” I see you are one of the sarpints [serpents], one of ould Wallace’s [Cornwallis’s] men; well now, I have two sons, one was at the catching of Johnny Burgoyne,
and the other at that of you ; and next year they are both going to catch Clinton at New York; but you shall be treated kindly, my mother came from the ould country.”

Samuel Graham, 76th Highland Regiment
Ashby Tavern in the early 20th century. Sadly, the building was destroyed by a runaway truck in the 1930s.

It would take the prisoners most of the day to make the laborious climb up and over the Blue Ridge. Their discomfort grew when they crossed the frigid and waist deep waters of the Shenandoah near sunset. Many men lost their footing and were dunked in the cold and swirling waters.

Late in the next day the prisoners finally arrived on the outskirts of Winchester. It was a journey of sixteen days and over 240 miles. With the prisoners secured it was time for the Fauquier militia to return to their homes. A number of militiamen would recount their experience decades later as they applied for their military pensions. Spencer Withers of Warrenton was one of those men. In August 1832 he went before the Fauquier County court to testify to his military service. He claimed service in the Carolinas in 1780, and that he had fought with Lafayette in Virginia in the summer of 1781. After Yorktown he “marched with prisoners towards Winchester and was discharged at Ashby’s Gap about Christmass.” Withers would also testify on behalf of the family of Captain Linchfield Sharpe of Fauquier County. The old soldier recalled how Sharpe “was in command with the prisoners at the top of the mountain at Ashby’s Gap.”

To learn more about how the American Revolution affected the Virginia Piedmont Heritage Area we invite you to come out to our Drive-Thru History program on August 21st. Visit our headquarters at 1461 Atoka Road, Marshall, VA from 5:30 to 7:30 PM for a casual and family-friendly educational program. We’ll be looking at some of the soldiers from our area, talking uniforms and equipment, and exploring the impact of the conflict on the civilian population. We do ask that all guests maintain at least 6 feet of distance from other family groups and that they wear masks when interacting with staff and volunteers. For more information visit www.piedmontheritage.org/events.

“There was a want of vigilance”: Intelligence in the Bristoe Station Campaign

The Mosby Heritage Area is a wide landscape of historic rivers and turnpikes crisscrossed by rail lines. Our location in between the Potomac River and Richmond was crucial to United States and Confederate forces during the Civil War, even though relatively few large-scale battles were fought here. The Heritage Area did see a number of fast-moving campaigns as armies attempted to out-flank, out-smart, and out-maneuver each other along essential travel and supply lines. The Bristoe Campaign in October 1863 falls under this category. Much of this campaign was colored by scant information, leading to close shaves on both sides before A.P. Hill’s decisive action on October 14th.

Fall 1863 found Generals Meade and Lee apparently deadlocked in central Virginia on opposite sides of the Rapidan River between Orange Courthouse and Culpeper Courthouse. Both Union and Confederate commanders learned hard lessons on the road from Gettysburg, and both recently sent supporting corps to the western theater. By October, Meade and the Federal Army seemed prepared to make winter quarters. The United States position at the fork of the Rapidan and Rappahannock controlled not only the Rappahannock crossing, but also the crucial supply line of the Alexandria & Orange railroad.

Culpeper Courthouse (center building with cupola) during the Civil War

Plans for a peaceful fall were thwarted when the Federal signalmen on Pony Mountain intercepted a message on October 7. Lee was on the move. Not knowing the Confederate codes had been broken, Lee urged his commanders to be careful and quiet as they skirted the Federal line, attempting to cut off Meade’s rear route along the A&O. But since receiving the decoded message, Federal scouts were primed to notice graycoats moving on the right flank, and campfires missing from the Confederate main body by night. With the signal towers going silent as armies began to move, they would have to rely on traditional intelligence- namely their cavalry- for information during the rest of the campaign.

Meade’s first requirement was to find out where exactly the Confederates were headed. He sent John Buford’s cavalry division to scout the Federal right flank for more signs of Lee, but recalled him after not hearing for two days. Meanwhile, Stuart’s Confederate cavalry harassed Gregg’s and Kilpatrick’s Federal cavalrymen in the vicinity of Brandy Station, resulting in erroneous reports that the Confederate forces were concentrating in Culpeper. By the time the Federal forces caught wise, Ewell’s and Hill’s divisions were closing on Warrenton, having swung wide to catch Meade’s rear on the A&O. Meade acts swiftly to outmaneuver the rebels, benefiting from a direct route up the A&O towards the fortifications at Centreville. The race was on.

With both armies moving quickly, reconnaissance was done on the fly, leading to fighting at Auburn on October 13th when Stuart tried poking around the Union supply train and found himself surrounded by the Federal Second and Third Corps. He his own men, supplies, and artillery in a ravine during the night, a mere 300 yards from his foes. The following morning Stuart surprised a regiment of breakfasting Yankees with a volley from his artillery. His bluff succeeded in unseating Gouvenor Warren’s Second Corps, which marched quickly along the A&O and by early afternoon had reached Bristoe Station.

Historical markers near the site of Coffee Hill

The afternoon of October 14th found A.P. Hill scouting for an attack. From his position the Confederate Second Corps could just make out the Federal Third and Fifth Corps moving from eastward over Broad Run. If the rebels moved quickly (without reconnaissance), they just might catch them. Instead Hill’s North Carolinians under Cooke and Kirkland were caught by Warren’s Second Corps, which had been recuperating from the morning fighting at Auburn, taking shelter on the southern side of the high railroad embankment. Unseen until the last moment, Federals sprang up and fired, cutting down waves of gray-clad rebels. Over the next couple of hours about 2,000 men fell, effectively putting an end to Lee’s devices on Meade’s supply route.

The Union Second Corps position under Gouvenor Warren fired on Confederates from behind this embankment. Photo by Douglas Ullman, Jr.

While Gouvenor Warren earned some praise for his action at Bristoe Station, the United States press was reluctant to call the battle a Union victory. There was even talk of Meade’s replacement. In the Confederacy, there was little doubt that Bristoe was a blunder and a loss. Hill was lambasted as a fool for making an attack with so little information. Confederate President Jefferson Davis critically pointed out, “There was a want of vigilance”.

Though much of the area surrounding Bristoe Station has been developed, preservation efforts have ensured that large sections of the battlefield are open to learn and explore. For more information about the battle and ongoing preservation, visit our friends at the Bristoe Station Battlefield Park!

Class Activity: In your own words, answer the following questions

  1. What are different ways Civil War officers gained intelligence or communicated with each other? Describe at least two.
  2. Examine the image above, “The Union second corps position.” United States troops sheltered behind this railroad embankment during the battle. What made it such a good position?
  3. Why do you think we should preserve historic landscapes like the battlefield near Bristoe Station?